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I. Introduction
Safeguards systems are insta11ed in nuc1ear faci1ities to prevent
or to detect diversion of fissile material. A condition on the systems
considered is that they must have a "negligib1e" chance of dec1aring
a false alarm under normal management practices.
In this paper agame theoreticmode1 for a safeguards system based on
f10w measurements of fissile material is deve10ped and analysed. The op-
timal behaviour of the faci1ity's profit-maximizing operator and safe-
guards authority is defined and determined.
2. Description of the Safeguards Procedure
We conceive the fabricating, reprocessing or other faci1ity (possib1y
part of a 1arger faci1ity) as possessing one legal entrance and one legal
exit for the fissile material.
--'-----0 J -kc i il+~
measuring 1
instrument
---'---0---------------;:,.
measuring
instrument
l)Paper presented at the IAEA Working Panel on Systems Analvsis, heIn
on 25-29 August 1969, Vienna
2)Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Strukturanalyse und langfristige Planung,
Universität, Gesellschaft für Kernforschung, Karlsruhe
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Between two inventory takings, a certain amount In of material is to
be weighed out and processed in a number of prescribed portions.
This amount rn will later be taken as a unit of mass for the material.
Since the weighing will be inexact due to stochastic measurement errors,
the true input M is a random variable. Stochastic measurement errors
are also made in determining the output.
These measurements, as weIl as m, are registered into arecord book,
on the basis of which the nominal value, Le. the book inventory can
be calculated.
When the facility is closed down - for instance during an inventory
the book inventory can be compared with the physical inventory. The phy-
sical inventory is treated as apo rtion of the output. We ass U1l1e the
measurements of the material flow are unbiased; and in particular that
the expected value of M is m. This can be achieved by concentrating the
measuring instruments in so-called "strategie points", where inspectors
of the safeguards authority can control the measurements.
Let U be the difference between the p 0 r tion m and the output-measure-
ment.
U is the sum
U = e + v + m - M - ~ (2. 1. )
where v is the net amount of retained material in the facility, e the
actual amount of illegally diverted material, m - M the deviation of the
real input M from the nominal m, and ~ the output measurement error, that
is the deviation of the measurement from the true value. We assume the
input M to scatter 50 slightly that we can take v, m-M, r stochastically
independent. We define A as
and get
A ~= m - M - ~
U = e + v + A
(2.2.)
(2.3.)
The normal working proces5 of the facility allows only a finite variation
interval [.!,v] for v.
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(2.4.)
else
{
I
r--
= ~~ag(y)
As the measurement of the throughput is composed of several stochasti-
cally independent measurements of portions of the whole input and out-
put, the distribution of A resembles a normal distribution (by the
central limit theorem). We take for this distribution a'normal distri-
bution without tails~ which has a density
2
e-1az
1:(~ 4c} has still to be fixed, r> 1 is the normalising factor such that
J g(y) dy • I
-1:
To facilitate some of the computations we shall later on sometimes use
the normal density
1
-{Zifu
2
-~
e for y e' IR
instead of g(y)
The operator and the safeguards authority are supposed to know the distri-
bution function of v and A. lf the operator is interested in an illegal
diversion of fissile material, he decides before the beginning of the
working period, which rate e ELO,I) of the nominal input m he wants to
A
divert (Yet we assume e to be less than the divertable amount M- ~).
Just so, the safeguards authority has to choose (possibly in a random
process) a number 6, before the beginning of the measurements or book
checking. OE(O,I) is abound such that in the case b ~ e legal processing
. ~
is $t~Ted; in the case U ) 0 a search in the facility is arranged (here
and in the following, we de~Jte the realisation of a random variable y
Aby y).
The search includes a thorough cleaning of the facility and yields the
portion av of the material v retained in the plant. a is a constant dose
to I, known to operator and safeguards authority.
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The measurement of av is the random variable W=av + k (2.7) where
the random variable k is the deviation of the measurement of the
washed out material av from the true value aVe k is not necessarily
independent of aVe In the case
f\,
U - a
A 1 f\-
the inspector states: The amount of U - - W-€ has been diverted. In
~ 1 ~ a
the case U - - W~€ legal processing is stated. The choice of the value
Cl
of g is a matter of judgement and should be so large, that legal proces-
sing is recognized wH:h probabili ty elose to 1. For the game € is a con-
stant.
3. The game in normal form
Gains and losses of the safeguards authority and the operator depend
on the outcome of the safeguards procedure. These pay-offs are partly
fixed by polidcal agreements. In the following disposition the pay -offs
depend linearly (up to constants) on the diverted amount e respectively
f\ 1 A
on the amount U - - W-€ stated as diverted. In general the pay-offs
a.h 1 A
will depend on e or u - - W-€ monotonely in the same direction as in the
a
linear disposition shown in table 3.1.
\
Considering the purpose of safeguarding, case I is a bad outcome for the
safeguards authority (e>o) , case 11 1 is even worse, whereas case 112 is
a good outcome.
Therefore the pay-off or the utility of the illspection authority can be
taken as the negative of the operator's pay-off. We assume (asusual)
that the players i.e. operator and inspector guide their behaviour along
J
the expected value of the pay-offs. Let d(e,S) be the expectation of the
operator's pay-off under the strategies e and S. The operator is player
and the safeguards authority player 2. Theothe normal form of the two-
person zero sum game is
(e €[0,1] , S€ [0, iJ , 6) (3.1.)
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For the calculation of Owe use the auxiliary function
(3.2.)
which is the probability that, under the choice of e and 0, an illegal
diversion of an amount>n is stated by the inspector. We call f(e,n,o)
the probability of detecting an illegal action.
Probabilities further needed can all be expressed by f(e,e,1.):
p(U-::-O) = 1 - f(e,O,-oo)
p(U>6" U - ~ W-e:=O) = f(e,8,-«» - f(e,6,o)
(3.3.)
The pay-off- function d involves the expectation Ex of the amount X
declared as diverted:
X:= LJ ;
U - ..:..w-e:
a
forU~e 1
for Ul'O, U - -!. W - e: ~ 0 )
for U - ~ W- e: >- C 1 (3.4.)
Let f be piecewise smooth and
lim n f(e,8,n) = 0 (3.5.)
l'j,? >0
which is true in the special cases treated in the end of this paper.
By the mean value theorem of differential calculus the probability of
stating the diversion of an amount
e:(n ,n+lln ) with n ~ 0 is equal to
f(e,O,n) - f(e,8,n+ll~) =
with he:(O,I). It follows
~ '\fEx = Jn(-;;- (e,8,n) dn
o (.:n
Using f, we can express (0/ as
Jf
- ~~ (e,8,n+ hlln)lln
~. I1
by partial integration
""
= J f(e,6,n)dn
o
(3.6.)
6"(e,e) = de(J - f(e,8,o» + E (f(e,8,-oo) - f(e,8,o)}
O<l
- C f(e,6,o) - c Sf(e,6,n)dn
o
(3.7.)
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One can assume that f depends continuously on(e,a,n) in all practically
interesting cases. Then ~ is continuousin (e,a). The discrete extension
(p,Q,d) of the game is strictly determinate, and has agame value and
optimal strategues, i.e. min - max strategies. Using his optimal stra-
tegy, player 1 gets at least the game value, whereas player 2 has to
pay no more than the game value when using his optimal strategy x)
In the following,we make assumptions about the distribution of measur-
ing deviations A and k, such that already the nonextended game
(eE[O,I), aE(O,I], 6) is strictly determinate, and both players have
optimal strategies. These are calculated for fixed parameters.
4. Costs of safeguards
Besides the costs of the control of measuring instruments, in this
model there arise costs for the safeguards authority depending on the
outcome of the safeguards procedure. In the case 11 1 the safeguards
authority has to pay the costs A of the search, the production losses
during the search, lost orders and the amendment for false charge.
In the case 112 the safeguards authority can be rewarded by getting the
fines included in the penalties.
The expectation of the costs under the strategies(e,8) is
00
K(e,8) = A [f(e,a,-~) -f(e,a,o)] - Bf(e,8,o) - bJ f(e,a,n)dn
o
where A and Bare components of C (A+B~C) and b is component of c.
(4.1.)
If the safeguards authority has several min-max strategies, the optimal
strategies can be restricted to the min-max-strategies with favourable
expected costs.
x) See, e.g. M. Dresher, Games of Strategy
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5. Reduction of the sets of strategies
Before the calculation of min-max-strategies in 2 person zero sum
ga~one eliminates the dominated strategies at first.
Def. X dominates X' respecting y
if a(x,y) ~ a(x'y) for all yE y and
a(x,y) > a(x~y) for one y
y dominates y' respecting X, if
a(x,y) :::. a(x,y) for alt xeX and a(x,y) <. a(x,y'>
for one xeX
The elimination of dominated strategies is called reduction.
We assume that the random variables v,A,k are essentially bounded.
The bounds of their domain then yield statements about dominated stra-
tegies and a reasonable determination of the quantity ~.
The random variables take values in the following intervals with proba-
bility 1 (we take the smallest intervals with this property).
r ~, v J ~ I'V
[ -I:, I:1 "-
-3 A
~ [ -T, T "] " PoJ A (5.1.)av -
r " 1 for " T ~kl L -av, T av - <0
The condition that no false alarms should be possible, yields the
requi rement
e ~ e
o
(5.2.)
where
max{ U - .!. Wie 01 . {E +! for av - no }e = = (5.3.)0 a I: + v for av - T~O
A..
We define a as the greatest lower bound of all a with the property: u>e
" 1 ~ • • f\. -implicates U - - W'7 e ~ndepende.nt of the sue of W. Then 8 dominates
a
all e>8' • The calculation yields
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e = e:- e:o
+ {:::
2T
+-
<X
T
+v+-
a
for
av - T~ 0
av - T <0
J(5.4.)
Accordingly we define e as the least upper bound of all e with the pro-
t-_ <. e' l' - U" 1 wA <. 'd d fA Th CI d •perty: U = l.mp l.cates - - , = e: l.n epen ent 0 w. en" oml.nates
a
all strategies e<~. The inspector will therefore choose strategies only
from the interval t~, '0]
One gets for a
J~ + l: T> - .! ~ c lv---v \
a Cl
a = e; - e;o + + l: for - T;>o 2 T (5.5. )\~ v---o va - a+ l: Tv-- -<0
.-Ja
regarding the assumption W~ o.
For the values v = 0,02; l: = 0,05; 2T = 0,02; a =
we get
ä = 0,09; ~ = 0,06
1; v = 0,01, e; = e:
o
The range [~,e1 is therefore far smaller than [0,1 J.
Just as the inspector, the operator can take into account that the inspec-
tor will use strategies only out of [~,eJ. He will therefore take into
account only strategies e which are favourable against the inspector's
strategies E[~, §}, Le. he reduces his set of strategies, respecting
[~,ij]. For this purpose we define e by
e .• inf i.e I U » 'ä -~
The calculation yields
(5.6.)
2T
+-
a
;-ä-v+l:
(v - ~ + 2l:
=e;-e: +)
o \ v_v + 2l:
for
T
+v+ä
av -
av -
T~ 0 '}
T<;.. 0
(5.7. )
Strategies e > e are then no longer interesting for the operator.
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Remark: For r = T = 0, e: = e: and v = v we get e = 0 in accordance
o
with reality.
The set of strategies to be considered by the operator can as weIl be
bounded by ~ from beneath:
~ = g. 1. b. {eI U - ~ W; e: \
A little calculation gives
e = e:-e:
o
(5.8.)
It is therefore convenient, to choose e: = e: (E defined above). We fix
o 0
e: = e: for the remainder of this paper.
o
Remark: For the reduction of the sets of strategies we have only used the
fact that the cases I, 11 1 are unfavourable for the inspector , whereas
the case 112 is favourable for him. The special form of the pay-offs has
not been used.
For the reduction of the strategy sets it was essential that the random
variables are essentially bounded. To get these bounds for npproximately
nörmally distributed random variables we cut off the taBs of the respec-
tive normal densities symmetrically to the expected value such that there
is to be expected only a slight operator's loss at false alarm. Therefore
we get the condition that the terms of the pay off-function ~ are close
to zero for e = 0 and every 8.
In the numerical example considered later on this condition yields bounds
re:[4a,601 for A. The domainsr~,ä]and[~,e] fixed above are then domains
over which optimal strategies can be conjectured to randomize.
Remark: In this model an illegal diversion is stated only after a thorough
search. If the random variables v and Aare bounded as assumed above, then
one can state a diversion already after the first measurement, namely in
" -the case U >r + v. As the stated "diverted amount" one can then take
max (U - r - v, U- ! W- e:). This additional possibility of detection is
CL
essential only if the measurement error k takes large values with a great
probability; we exclude this case.
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6. Discussion of parameters
The optiaml strategies of safeguards authority and operator are
functions of the pirameters c, d, C, , ••••• As the pay--off-function (J
is very complicated these functions do not have a simple analytical
form. Therefore we reflect, in which regions the parameters can variate J
we then compute function values for combinations of some arguments out
of these regions and analyse the influence of the parameters on the
function values.
The parameter regions listed in the following table 6-1 refer to a re-
processing plant with a half-year period between two inventory takings
and a throughput of approximately 100 kg Pu per period. The price of
Pu is assumed to be 40 ~/g. The control refers to Pu alone.
The mean value of C in the table has the.order of magnitude of the loss
caused by a production standstill of 8 days i.e. 200 000 ~.
7. Calculation of the optimal strategies
At first we assume that v = v m V is constant and that the devia-
tion k from the true value av is zero. The considerations on the re-
duction of the sets of strategies yield a = ~ + E =~, i.e. there is
exactly one undomina~ed strategy of the inspector. Therefore e = e
is his unique optimal strategy. E is equal to E. For this E = E
8: = v+ E dominates all other 8, even if A is assumed to be normally
distributed with variance 0 2 and expectation O.
For the auxiliary function (3.2.)
we get
f(e,8,n) =
=
=
p(e+~+A>8 ~ e + A-L>n)
p()..':7 max (8-v, n+ L) - e)
1 _ ~ (max(e-~+ E) - e)
o
. (7.1)
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The probability to detect an illegal action is then
f(e,~,O) = 1- <p< E - e(J ) (7.2)
As the expectation of the amount to be declared as diverted we have in
the case 0= 8:
&x =
=
J' (1- ;( !l,+_2:-_e_ ) )dl'\.
o (J
(7.3)
The safeguards costs are
K(e, ~) = -B (l-~( 2:-e »
o ')
(J (E-e)"-)
-b (- exp (- -y +
-I21T' 20
E-e~E+e)(l-~( - »(J
(7.4)
That means, the safeguards authority has no costs.
The pay-off-function for the operators is
cr(e, 8) = de~( E-e)_ C(l-~( ~-e»(J (J
_ c (~ exp (_ (L_~)2) + (_L+e)(l_~(E-e:»
.{?:; 20'- 0
Instead of the unprecise demand:
A€/--I., 2:7 with probability c10se to 1, we now require the terms
- - ')
I. I. (J Ob)""C~( Ö ), c~ (ö)' c 1Zn' exp (- 202 ) of the pay-off function if to be less
than a 1itt1e number, e.g. 1 g. Then L~ ~4(J, 60_7, and the operator has to
expect a loss of 3 ~.
By simple analytical arguments it can be shown that O(e,q) takes its maximum
at a sole argument e(), 'Which is in the interval (0,2:). Therefore eO is the
unique optimal strategy of the operator.
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In the tab1es 7-1 the strategies e~ are listed for specific combinations
of parameters. From the tab1e 7-1, 1 and 2 one can perceive the relatively
small influence of the penalties C and c on the optimal strategy ecrand
on the pay-off a(eO'~)' From table 4 one can perceive that the pay-off
O(ed'~) to the operator increases almost linearly with d, whereas the amount
e cr remai~9lmost unchanged. On the contrary, the technical parameters er and ~
have ~strong influence on the optimal strategies of both players. From
table 1 we perceive that elf has approximatt;;ly the size of 0.8 ~, and that the
pay-off increases almost linearly with L.
The following graph shows the probability f(e,§,O) of detection and the expec-
tation EX of the amount X declared as diverted (Fig. 1).
In the fol1owing we leave the incisive assumption v = v. It seems to be reasonable
to take v as rectangular distributed over the interval L-~, v7. We assume the
measurement of washed-out material Qv to be exact enough, so that the error ~
can be subdued. Then we have
E = E =E, 6 = v + E, 8 = v + E
o
Let
(7.6 )
be the density of the random variable v. Then we get
(7.7)
=
00
J
-00
Now it is easily shown that 6 dominates all 6>8 and that ~ dominates all
6< 6 if A is distributed according to ~( ~ ). The probability of detecting
_' er
a diversion for eEL-~, e 7 is equal to
1f(e,8,O)= 1+
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8-v-e
j-(8-v-eH ( E-~)-(8-v-eH ( ---)
v-v - 0 - 0
2
+~ (exp(- (E-e) )-exp(-
~ 202 (7.8)
For 8€L-!, 87 the amount X to be declared as diverted has the expectation
8-v-e
+ _1 L-{(8-~-e)(E-e)+02} (cp( -0-.-
v-v
)-H~ »
o
(7.9)
82dThe second partial derivative o8~ is pos1t1ve for all 8€L-8,8_7 and
e€L-C,l_7, i.e. (j is strictly convex in 8. Therefore a pure strategy8E[""!, 87
lis the on1y optimal strategy of the inspector.
By agame theoretic theorem an optimal strategy for the operator is to
randomize over at most two values e l , e2 €L-o, 1_7.
The coefficients of d,E,C,c are functions of e and e. Every function h(e,O)
of these coefficient functions has the property
h(E+v-y,8) >h(e,8)for e>L+v-y simultaneously in all eE~!,~.
Therefore the pure strategies e I ,e2 over which an optimal strategy randomizes
are E:L-0, E+V-:l.J.
We did not succeed 1n proving that these coefficient functions are COficave
in e€L-O,4+V~v_7. But it can be hoped that critself is strict1y concave in e
for the interesting parameter combinations of d,C,C,L,O: then there exists
exact1y one oFtima1 strategy; this is a pure strategy.
In the extreme case E=O we have
d(~,e) < cf( e,e) for e€(~, 8' J
simultaneously for all e. Therefore ~ is the optimal strategy of the operator.
As 8 is abound of the interval L-~, ~-Z there is an optimal pure strategy
of the operator which is an argument maximizing the function rr(~, e)
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Similarly, for very large E corresponding to d = c = 0, C = ° we get
8 as the optimal strategy of the inspector, whereas the operator has again
a pure optimal strategy.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the conflict inherent in safeguarding fissile
material can be handled in formal game theoretic terms. For several examples
of realistic data, calculations have been given of the inspector's optimal
behaviour according to the model developed.
It turns out the political parameters, whose values are hard to obtain, have
only a small influence. The technical parameters, for instance measurement
variance, influence the optimal strategies to a far greater extent.
The practical conclusions are two. The facility should be designed so that
the technical parameters governing the uncertainty in the amount of fissile
materials involved should be small.
In order that optimal inspection behaviour be calculable, the technical
parametenomust also be accurately known.
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f(e 8,0)
0.5
e
Fig. 1: Probability of detection f(e,e,O) and expectation
va1ue f X of the amount X dec1ared as diverted as a
function of the arnount e to be diverted (L:=E=O.03;
0=0.005)
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Tab1e 3-1: Outcomes and Pay-offs Possib1e for a P1ay
Operator chooses ee [0, IJ
Outcome of the safeguards
procedure (p1ay)
case I
~ ~ S
statement; legal processing.
I
cont; n uation of work
case 11
!'U >- S , search
,~ 1!'J.
case 11 u - - w-el' a
statement: no deviation has
taken p1ace
f'. 1"
case 112 , U - ä W>e
statement: the amount
I' 1 f'.
of U - - W-e was diverteda
safeguards authority chooses Se [0, 1]
Pay-off to the operator (uti1ity of
the operator)
de, d>a is the (subjective) uti1ity
of the operator per material unit
(nominal input)
de + E, E >0 is composed of the poli-
tica1 gain and an amendment for false
charge
AI"
-c -c (U - - W-e)
a
C}o is composed of the costs of the
search and the production losses during
the search, the losses by lost orders
and the penalty for illegal diversion.
c(u~-e) is an additional penalty for
a
the declared amount of diverted materi-
al.
The pena1ties can take into account the
time of the p1ant's standstill
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Table 6-1 Cost parameters and technica1 parameters
value minimal mean maximal
C 2 104 2.105 2 106 ~
E 2 103 2 104 2 105 ~
c 4 106 4 107 4 108 ~
d 4 106 4 107 4 108 ~
0 0.0015 0.005 0.015
L 0.009 0.03 0.06 +)
- 0.003 0.01 0.03v
0 0.002 0.01 +)v
-
T 0.006 v 0.02 v 0.06 V-
A C C C25 S-
B 0 C C10 '2
b 0 C rS- v
+). • .
marg1nal cond1t1ons
40 :f L
A+B~C
~­
v=v
Tab1es 7-1
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Optimal strategies
0 eo o'(ed , ~) in ~
0.0015 0.009 6.6563 10-3 2.3718 105
0.005 0.03 2.3125 10-2 8.2212 105
0.01 0.06 4.625 10-2 1.6611 106
0.015 0.06 4.312 10-2 1.4350 106
2. 7 z: = 0.06; 0'" = 0.01c = d = 4.10
C ed 6(ed'~)
104 10-2
6
2 4.6875 1.6779 10
105 _'l 1062 4.625 10'- 1.6611
2 1'06 4.3125 10-2 1.5470 106
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e O(e , 6 )
c 0 o -
4 106 4.6875 10-2 1.6768 106
4 107 4.625 10-2 1.6611 106
4 108 4.3125 10-2 1.5615 106
cl e cr'(eo' ~)0
h _7 1054 10~ 4.1250 10 ~ 1.4919
107
-')
1064 4.625 10 ... 1.6611
4 108 4.6875 10-2 1.6938 107
